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Introduction
One of the iconic books in Western European political theory is Leviathan (Hobbes 2008) . In it Thomas Hobbes depicts an anarchic world he calls the 'state of nature' in which life is 'nasty, brutish and short' because we have no means of protecting ourselves from the predations of our fellow man. As a remedy he recommends we trade some of the unfettered freedom we might enjoy in the state of nature for the security we may obtain from submitting to sovereign rule.
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Although the main line of Hobbes' argument is well-known, one surprising feature of the book is its peculiar organisation. Rather than start his treatise with a summary of the central political argument, Hobbes begins the book with a lengthy inquiry into the nature of language. He motivates this unexpected digression on the grounds that, before individuals can establish a commonwealth, they must first agree upon a common meaning for words. If so, Hobbes surely would despair of the current state of semantics in our financial system. Here unambiguous meaning is elusive, and drawing even the most basic distinctions is difficult. In some cases the same word refers to different concepts. 2 Thus 'shares' on the stock market mean publicly traded securities that confer on their owners rights to a variable dividend, while 'shares' in a credit union context signify non-tradable claims for a nominally fixed principal, akin to a bank deposit. In other instances, different words are used to refer to the same financial concept. 3 For example, what are called gilts in the United Kingdom may be called government bonds elsewhere (Bholat 2013 ).
These ambiguities may foster financial instability. For Hobbes, political stability is enhanced by the settlement of metapolitics-the domain and definition of the key terms used by people in political debate. According to Hobbes, conflict ensues when people disagree about the relative priority of terms: for instance, whether maximising 'individual autonomy' or 'income equality' is more important, or when there is ambiguity regarding the definition of such terms-when one party conceives of 'individual autonomy' as meaning doing whatever one pleases, while another party conceives of it as acting virtuously, for example. Similarly, financial stability is enhanced by the settlement of metadata. If there is disagreement about the meaning of key terms in financial transactions then conflicts ensue. One recent example is the controversy about whether the restructuring of Greece's sovereign debt obligations constituted a "credit event." 4 However, forging a common language either in politics or in finance is not an easy task. Unlike Hobbes in his thought experiment, real world financial professionals are not afforded the luxury of starting fresh from first principles. Instead they must start by confronting sunk costs in the form of legacy IT systems and operational 1 Writing in the sixteenth century, Hobbes could be read as an apologist for then-prevailing absolutist monarchies. But insofar as Hobbes roots sovereignty in popular consent, as opposed to divine right or natural law, he may be equally interpreted as a proto-democratic philosopher.
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Technically speaking, this problem is known as polysemy.
3
This problem is known as synonymy in the jargon. processes, and scepticism from some staff about implementing transformative change to the existing data infrastructure. As a consequence, efforts to create a common financial language in the real world must take these rigidities as given. This means making the case for common data standards through pilots that improve on and build from data infrastructures already in place.
In this paper I describe one small-scale pilot recently undertaken at the Bank of England. This exploratory exercise attempted to harmonise three forms with inconsistent language used by the Statistics and Regulatory Data Division (SRDD) to collect financial data from firms: Form ER (Effective Interest Rates on Sterling Business By Sector), Form BE (Additional Balance Sheet Sectoral Detail) and FSA054 (Currency analysis). The narrow objective of this pilot was to assess opportunities for improved operational efficiency, namely to investigate if data currently collected by three different forms and their associated work processes could be done once, with potential long-term savings for both the Bank of England and its reporters. 5 The broader motivation was to take first steps toward creating a common language for regulatory reporting and central bank statistics.
The article is organised as follows. The first section explains the purpose of this pilot and situates it within a broader narrative of how primary data has been collected historically by the Bank of England. 6 Although much is written about the Bank's policy decisions and forecasts, less is known about the data that underpin these, particularly how that data is gathered. So one of the objectives of this article is to contribute to the literature on how central banks operate, in the tradition of Hennessy's (1992) study of internal operations at the Bank of England in the period between 1930 and 1960. This section also explains how the traditional approach to data is changing, as announced in the Bank's recently released Strategic Plan.
The second section of the article then details the specific steps taken to demonstrate that the Bank could regenerate aggregate figures currently collected using forms ER, BE and FSA054 from raw instrument-by-instrument data. The motivation for proving this concept was to provide assurance to senior leaders that the transition from the current data collection method to a new approach could occur without diminishing the Bank's ability to generate existing aggregate figures, and with the added benefit that switching to a single granular collection would make the metadata more standard. 7 Thus this article accords with a number of recent papers published by staff at various central banks that claim benefits accrue to central banks from using micro-data to compile aggregate statistics and conduct macro-analysis (centralbanking.com 2014; Matos 2013; Gaytán 2013; Hille 2013; Menezes and D'Aguilar 2013) . It also chimes with a growing chorus of central banks calling for a common financial language, and some recent initiatives like Project ACTUS, the AnaCredit project, 8 the European Central Bank's data dictionary and SDMX
5
The principal reporters are UK banks, building societies, credit unions and insurers. 6 The Bank uses a range of secondary data sources collected by commercial vendors and other public agencies. The Bank also collects primary data through a number of surveys and interviews not discussed here.
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Balanced against these benefits are potential financial costs to central banks incurred from putting place systems to aggregate granular data and to reconcile with reported data.
6 metadata work at the Bank of England and in other countries that have made practical contributions in this regard.
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Of course, granular data can be collected without standards, just as standards can be established for aggregate data. However, as this paper explains, and other scholars have noted, there is an elective affinity between the pursuit of data standards, on the one hand, and granular data, on the other (Ali 2014; Bennett 2013; Bholat 2013; Kohn 2011; Jones et al. 2000) . Indeed the link between data granularity and standardisation was the subject of a major international conference cosponsored by the Bank of England, European Central Bank and Office of Financial Research last year (Haldane et al. 2015) . 10 However, in general, the existing scholarly literature does not shed light on the mechanics of transition. In other words, the existing literature does not describe how to persuade senior leaders that change is required. And while information integration is a much discussed topic in computer science (Brank 2005; Wache 2001 ) there is little written about it in the finance and central banking literatures. This article aims to fill that lacuna by discussing the detailed steps required to rationalise multiple financial data collections having inconsistent metadata into a single, standard, conceptually integrated metadata model.
The final section concludes the article by reflecting on larger issues raised by the pilot. A key part of the international package of regulatory reforms has been enhancing the breadth, depth, quality and timeliness of data disclosed by financial firms to central banks and supervisory authorities. 11 During the financial crisis, many financial firms were not equipped with the infrastructure to quickly aggregate their data across legal entities and counterparties. This impaired central banks' and supervisory authorities' ability to identify the appropriate recovery and resolution mechanism for firms (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2013). However, effective risk aggregation and reporting by financial firms to central banks and supervisory authorities, and the latter's ability to aggregate data on individual firms to gain perspective on the financial system as a whole, is possible only when common standards exist for granular data; if the underlying definitions of instruments vary, they are not additive (Office of Financial Research 2013) . So coming to terms on standard metadata is critical for making workable enhanced risk reporting, identification and monitoring, and, by extension, the credibility of the international regulatory commitment that no financial firms will be too large or complex to fail in the future (Cunliffe 2014; Financial Stability Board 2011) . This article makes a small contribution to thinking how central banks can practically fulfil that commitment with the right infrastructure. (Capie 2012, p. 611-616) . These prudential returns are the direct antecedents of the suite of statistical forms still used by the Bank today. Figure 1 compares the historic form BS to the current Form BT.
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For an in-depth historical overview of statistical production at the Bank see (Heath 1988 Since the mid-1970s, the Bank of England's statistics division has continued to collect data through forms structured like standard financial statements. 13 This multiple forms-based method for collecting data made sense in the 1970s when data was delivered by post or in person, and data had to be physically stored in file cabinets. But the forms-based method for collecting data has become increasingly unwieldy and anachronistic in light of technological advances such as high speed internet and petabyte drives that mean traditional technological restrictions on data transmission and storage have been relaxed in the 'big data' era.
14 Specifically the forms-based method for collecting data has three key analytical limitations. The first analytical limitation relates to the timeliness of data. Most of these forms are filed quarterly, semi-annually and annually, meaning that there are lags between when data is published and the latest financial facts.
The second analytical limitation pertains to coherence and compatibility. 15 On their own terms, statistical and regulatory data forms can have coherence and
13
That is, like balance sheet and income statements, and variations thereof.
14 My claim here should not be construed as meaning all restrictions have been overcome. Technology is no panacea. The collection of ever more granular data raises legal, ethical and data quality issues I have discussed in greater depth elsewhere (Bholat 2015) .
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To avoid misunderstanding, the issue is not the existence of different bases, methods and conventions as such. For example, it is completely legitimate to want marketable securities reported at historic cost and 'fair' (current saleable) value. Rather, the issue is efficiency; ensuring that data is reported in a way that differing requirements can be covered by the fewest datasets.
9 compatibility. For example, Bank of England statistical forms are based on the internationally agreed System of National Accounts. The forms revolve around a comprehensive balance sheet (Form BT) and then expand out to other forms providing more granularity on different aspects of the balance sheet. Consistency and coherency is ensured by using common definitions and extensive cross-form checks. Similarly, many of the new regulatory forms are interrelated as they are aligned with different aspects of Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV reporting requirements. However, while statistical and regulatory data may have their own consistent internal logics, they may not be easy to integrate because statistical and regulatory forms often specify different consolidation bases, valuation methods, accounting conventions and definitions, and are reported at different frequencies due to different analytical purposes. 16 This imposes a third analytical limitation-the relevance of the data in meeting end users' needs. Since the forms are designed at their origin to answer particular analytical or policy questions, the data captured does not easily lend itself to other uses or secondary analysis. This is largely because the forms tend to collect only aggregate figures. As a result, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to subsequently drill down into the underlying instrument data constituting the aggregate to ask and answer new questions. This also makes it difficult to blend data sets together to gain the kind of comprehensive view on the financial system as a whole required to properly conduct macro-prudential policy.
These analytical limitations with the forms-based approach to data collection are compounded by operational inefficiencies. Each new form imposes marginal costs on the central bank. The introduction of a new form may require: the hiring of additional staff or the re-training of existing staff; the creation and modification of associated guidance notes and explanatory materials related to the form; the reengineering of IT systems and business workflows to perform new quality checks on the data; and consultation and periodic reviews of the new form with reporters. The magnitude of these costs is increasingly prohibitive. As Figure 2 shows, for the first time in the Statistics Division's history, the number of forms exceeds the number of staff, in spite of an increase in employee headcount in recent years. The graph probably underestimates the extent of the gap because it does not include ad-hoc data collections currently done by the division.
Figure 2
Bank of England forms-to-staff comparison, 1981 England forms-to-staff comparison, -2013 Although this rapid growth in the number of forms largely reflects the one-off establishment of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the on-boarding of its legacy Financial Services Authority (FSA) forms, increasing data demands from the Financial Stability Board (FSB), European authorities like the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Occupational and Pension Authority (EIOPA), and the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), among other Bank of England data users, means that the form-to-staff gap is likely to grow and persist for the foreseeable future.
The proliferation of forms also incurs marginal time and resource costs for reporters to the extent that statistical and regulatory data requirements differ from other financial disclosures made to market participants. Even the simplest regulatory request may set in train a complex set of operational tasks for reporters in order to fulfil it. Suppose a central bank introduces a new regulatory form. In order to populate this form, the reporter may need to hire additional staff; develop IT solutions for aggregating financial agreements stored in a myriad of departmental, subsidiary and branch databases; initiate data quality processes to calculate and validate the required regulatory aggregates; and, in some instances, pay auditors to certify the results.
If budget constraints and scarcity in staff were not issues, the costs imposed on central banks and reporting institutions might be justified if there was no overlap between each new form. However, as further detailed below, there are overlaps. For example, Figure 3 shows that Form BE, FSA047 (Daily Flows) and Form AD (Analysis of Deposits) each contain sections that collect data on deposits. 
Figure 3
Three forms collecting data on a single instrument class (deposits) with a box showing how they could be integrated in theory in a granular data infrastructure.
Source: Bank of England
The recording of the same instrument (deposits) on different forms generates inconsistencies. For example, retail deposits are defined in the guidance notes of Form BE as deposits arising from customers' acceptance of an advertised rate (including nil) for a particular product. But the definition of a retail deposit for liquidity forms like FSA047 differs materially, as these forms classify deposits as retail or not, depending on the nature of the counterparty; that is, whether it is a claim held by natural or legal persons (Financial Services Authority 2009). As a result of these definitional differences, data on the residual maturity of retail deposits cannot be easily compared with data on their sector composition. These incompatibilities and redundancies reflect the fact that forms are designed to meet specific end-user requirements. However, since end-users often formulate their data requirements in isolation from one another, overlaps and gaps crop up. (Brammertz et al. 2009, p. 10-14) .
12 cum Projects and Development Group (PDG) in 2011 to formulate an enterprisewide data management vision to tackle these issues. 19 That vision conceived of a single Bank-wide data infrastructure for collecting and warehousing standardised, granular -that is, instrument-by-instrument -data in a common metadata language jointly developed with reporters. 20 Key features of that vision are evident in the Bank's recently released Strategic Plan. In particular the Bank's strategic initiative 8 titled "One Bank data architecture" announced the organisation's intention to build an "integrated, but distributed, data architecture and governance, ensure data acquisition and integration are as efficient as possible and allow Bank-wide information-sharing with effective data management" (Bank of England 2014).
One approach to designing a conceptually integrated, but physically distributed, data infrastructure is to consolidate and reduce the number of forms submitted by reporting firms. The next section describes the steps by which this can be done, by reference to the experience of integrating Forms BE, ER and FSA054. The aim of the pilot was to decompose these three forms into their granular dimensions and show they could be regenerated on the basis of more elementary and standard categories. The working group responsible for the pilot felt this was important in order to minimise concerns about the mechanics of transitioning to a new method for collecting data. 21 In brief, we wanted to demonstrate that a common metadata model existed as an implicit, but unrealised, possibility within our current data collection, rather than having the metadata model perceived as an exogenously imposed alternative to the existing forms.
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The Projects and Development Group no longer exists. However, part of PDG formed the original core for the recently established Advanced Analytics Division.
20
Elements of this granular financial data vision have been put into practice in Europe through initiatives such as Securities Holdings Statistics, Money Market Statistical Reporting and the forthcoming Central Credit Register. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
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Related to managing internal stakeholders, the working group kept track of ambiguities and inconsistences in the existing forms and guidance notes and fed this information back to our colleagues so they could take steps to correct them. This by-product was important to show we were delivering immediate value as much as contributing to the future.
13 3 Process and Findings
Selection and analysis of forms for pilot
In order to understand the extent of overlap between existing forms and, by extension, the possibility of unifying them, a small pilot was undertaken, focused on three forms managed by the three business-as-usual (BAU) teams within the Statistics and Regulatory Data Division (SRDD): Form BE (overseen by the Money and Credit Group); Form ER (overseen by the Financial Statistics Group); and FSA054 (overseen by the Regulatory Data Group). These forms can be found in the appendix. Significantly, these forms were not cherry picked for the pilot. Rather they were selected indirectly and blindly. The senior managers of each of the respective BAU teams were asked which of their analysts could spare time to feed their expertise into this exercise, and the forms those analysts oversee were consequently integrated into the exercise. So the forms sampled in this pilot were selected using a blend of random and convenience sampling strategies.
At first glance these sampled forms have nothing in common because they serve very different end-analytical purposes. Form ER is used by the Bank of England to assess the timing and effect of changes in the Bank rate on market rates. Form BE is used to segment reporters' balance sheet by sector, as that term is defined by the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA95). 22 FSA054 is a microprudential liquidity return used to monitor currency mismatch between reporters' uses and sources of funds.
In sum there are a total of 690 boxes across forms BE, ER and FSA054. Each of these boxes represents an aggregate data item reported by firms. For instance box C6H4 on Form BE represents reporters' euro-denominated liabilities under sales and repurchase agreements with counterparties classified by ESA95 as the "non-profit institutions serving households" sector. 23 In trying to spot commonalities across these three forms, all 690 boxes were expressed as a string of code recorded in Excel. As the pilot team analysed each box on the forms, we asked ourselves:
• What data dimensions, that is, the attributes of the instruments underlying the aggregate figure, are captured by this box?
• Which possible values can those data dimensions assume?
• What are the data dimensions and the values that distinguish this box from the other 689 boxes and could be used to identify relevant data to populate the box if the code was used to retrieve data from a database containing all of the exposures of a firm?
22
ESA95 now has been superseded by ESA10. ESA10 was implemented only in September 2014, after completion of this small-scale pilot. Therefore the remainder of the text makes reference to the predecessor accounting framework (Eurostat 2013). 14 In order to answer these questions, recourse was made to both the forms and their guidance notes. 24 In some cases the string of code was straightforward to write. For instance box C6H4 on Form BE was described by six data dimensions with the following values: In other cases the resulting query string was more elaborate, usually when the guidance notes specified exclusions. For instance, form ER contains a section entitled "Memorandum items: Non-interest bearing loans/preferential loans. 25 The purpose of this section is to capture "non-interest bearing loans, including nonperforming loans, loans traded at discount and preferential loans but excluding intragroup loans" if "these loans represent 5% or more of outstanding balances" in any of the boxes on form ER in the section "Outstanding £Loans and Advances", i.e., items 40 to 69. 18 The reason for excluding such loans from the main sector analysis and recording them in the margin is that their inclusion is purported to distort assessment of changes in Bank rate on market rates. 26 An additional nuance is that preferential loans to reporters' staff secured on dwelling are excluded from the memorandum as they are covered separately by boxes in the main sector analysis section.
Therefore each box in the form ER section "Outstanding £ Loans and Advances" required both a positive description and a description of exclusions conditional on a threshold being reached. For instance, the column B box for data item (row) 48 quantifies the accrued interest flow over a month of a reporter's pound sterling loans to UK resident financial corporations (excluding banks and building societies), excluding the sum of non-interest bearing loans, non-performing loans, loans traded at discount and preferential loans when these loans exceed 5% of the overall balance for this item. This box was positively described with four data dimensions, having the following exclusions:
In some instances this also required reference to other guidance notes, especially the General Notes and Definitions, the Classification of Accounts guide and the Prudential Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms (BIPRU Handbook). General findings and first draft
In our first draft of the code we tried to maintain fidelity with terms currently used in the forms and guidance notes. For instance, the counterparty sector was recorded according to the ESA95 classification scheme used on Form BE:
• Financial corporations (including unlimited liability partnerships) other than monetary financial institutions;
• All non-financial corporations other than public corporations (including unlimited liability partnerships);
• Individuals and individual trusts;
• Unincorporated businesses other than unlimited liability partnerships;
• Non-profit institutions serving households. Indeed these figures probably underestimate the full extent of data overlap between forms for two reasons. First data dimensions were recorded only if they were referenced in the relevant forms and guidance notes. However, certain data dimensions apply to all forms but may be referenced only by one. For instance, only FSA054 explicitly records accounting convention (such as International Financial Reporting Standards) and the unit level of reporting (consolidated, solo basis and so forth). But these data are tacit dimensions of other forms as well. The second reason the count probably underestimates the true extent of data overlap between forms is that it does not account for similarity between different data dimensions. For instance, residency is recorded twice; once in relation to the residency of direct counterparties and again with respect to the residency of transferees to whom loans have been sold (indirect counterparties).
Refinement and restatement
A second draft of the code was then written to make it more conceptually precise. At this stage the working group applied two key principles characteristic of any robust data standard. The first principle is that the terms used for data dimensions, and their allowable values, should be mutually exclusive and disjoint. In practice this meant we had to parse terms in the original code. For instance, the term 'Financial corporations' conflates the legal form and economic function of counterparties. So the code for 'Financial corporations' was re-written as the union of two dimensions: 'Legal Form = Corporation' and 'Economic Function = Financial.' When drawing these fine-grained distinctions, logical gaps in the forms became apparent. For instance, while the ESA 95 sector scheme accounts for entities taking the legal forms of a publicly limited corporation, trust and unlimited liability partnership, it does not tease out mutual organisations and limited liability partnerships as distinct forms of legal organisation.
The second best practice principle applied at this stage was that the dimensions and values used in a data standard need to be cast in an analytically more abstract form than the terms ordinarily used by financial market participants. For example, it is common in derivative markets to distinguish between so-called 'European' and 'American' options. European options are options that can be exercised only on the option's maturity date, while American options allow the holder to exercise the option any time between the purchase of the option and maturity date. So one way regulators could collect data on derivatives markets is using a data dimension 'type of option' with permissible values 'American' and 'European,' among others. This, for instance, is how options are classified within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Classification of Financial Instruments (CFI) standard.
28
However, an alternative way to collect the data would be to use a data dimension termed 'exercise date' with permissible values being either a particular date (thus identifiable as European options) or a range of dates (thus identifiable as American options). The benefit of this approach is that the data dimension 'exercise date' is applicable to a much wider variety of financial instruments besides options; for example, the call (early withdrawal) option on certain fixed term bank deposits. This example is indicative of how existing standards for granular financial data can provide food for thought for regulators as they develop their own, and also how these existing standards and standard setting bodies can be enriched from dialogue with policymakers. Figure 7 illustrates the benefits of this more abstract approach.
See https://www.iso20022.org/standardsrepository/public/wqt/Description/mx/dico/codesets/_aQR7BNp-Edak6NoX_4Aeg_195526371 This specific figure unfolded during discussion of Form BE data item 29DB3A2 "Loans and advances (including amounts receivable under finance leases) other than overdrafts to Individual and individual trusts secured on dwellings (excluding bridging loans)" and BE data item 29D2A "Loans and advances (including overdrafts) to housing associations secured on residential property." 29 These data 29
In the guidance notes, item 29DB3A2 comprises mortgage loans to individuals and individual trusts secured by a first charge over properties (both freehold and leasehold) that are or will be occupied by the borrower, or that are rented out, and mortgage sub-participations fully and specifically secured against residential mortgage loans, as well as such loans that are fully secured on land. 29D2A is a record of mortgage loans to housing associations registered with the Homes & Communities Agency (HCA), the Greater London authority (GLA), the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive that are fully secured by a first priority charge on housing association residential property that is rented out. It also includes loans that meet all of the following conditions: (a) the development attracts a social housing grant; (b) the loans are fully secured by a first priority charge on the development property; and (c) the loans are fully secured by a charge (but not necessarily a first priority charge) on a housing association's residential property that is rented out. items sparked more general reflection in the group about the credit risk mitigation techniques available to reporters, of which security in the form of a first charge over real property is but one type. For instance, second charge mortgages are not differentiated from other forms of unsecured personal lending on Form BE. Although these mortgages probably represent at most an estimated 3 per cent of new mortgage lending in the UK in recent quarters, they are often used to borrow down payments for first charge mortgages and could be captured for micro-prudential purposes as a separate item indicating loosening lending standards.
Figure 8, 9, 10 and 11 group these concepts into taxonomies. The four conceptual taxonomies pertain to: original terms and conditions; metadata on the reporting unit and contract; entity characteristics; and subsequent events. Note that these taxonomies are illustrative and incomplete. They have been generated on the basis of the sampled forms and do not cover the full range of financial instruments and entities. 30 The taxonomies also remain preliminary. For example, another draft of the code could further unpick the conventional names given to financial instruments into distinct data dimensions, describing their terms and conditions, and their contracted and realised cash flow.
30
For example, the taxonomies do not cover derivatives in detail or their standard dimensions such as reference asset, delivery method, strike price, and exercise dates.
Figure 8
Original During the pilot some progress in this direction was made. For example in the current draft code the category 'fixed rate bonds' is described as There are two reasons why it is preferable to record financial instruments using their data dimensions rather than by their conventional name. 31 The first reason is that the same conventional name is often ascribed to different products and instruments. For example, a 'fixed rate bond' could refer to either a type of term deposit or an issued debt security, depending on financial market context. And even when the context is known, there may be ambiguity in the definition of products and instruments. For example, fixed rate bonds are defined in the form ER guidance notes as follows: "These products usually have a specified interest rate and maturity date. Customers may either lose interest by accessing their money before the maturity date or may 31 However, a delicate balance needs to be struck between abstraction and precision. For instance, from a purely legal and contracted cash flow perspective, deposits are just loans in reverse (loans made from households to banks). But the regulatory permissions of deposit takers and credit granting institutions are different so it is necessary to find a means for distinguishing between deposits and loans. The definition of fixed rate bonds in probabilistic, rather than deterministic, terms makes this data open to varying interpretations by different reporters. This introduces sources of reporting error.
However, it is unlikely that deterministic definitions of products and financial instruments can be achieved because of on-going financial innovation. 33 Nor would laying down such definitions necessarily be desirable. The 'correct' definition of instruments depends on analytical purpose. For example, it may make sense ordinarily to classify Cash Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) as time deposits, as form ER does. But during a liquidity crisis it may be more relevant to classify any accounts that allow immediate access to principal without penalty as sight deposits. So instead of trying to rigidly define a complex concept such as 'non-performing loans', for example, the basic unit days can be used to record how much time has passed since the last payment of principal or interest. Central banks would then have the flexibility to specify different thresholds for classifying loans as non-performing depending on end-analytical purpose and economic context.
The second reason to favour capturing financial products and instruments by data dimensions is that conventional names tend to vary geographically. For instance, 'sight deposit' is a term particular to UK banking. By contrast, these accounts are referred to as 'demand deposits' in the United States. So central bank data collections cast in local terms are at odds with the reality that the business of their largest reporters is global, and that finance itself is a universal activity.
This last observation raises a more general issue. Some conceive of central bank reporting burden in quantitative terms, as a function of the volume of data reported to the authorities, whether measured in bytes or the number of boxes on forms. But another way to conceive of central bank reporting burden is in qualitative terms; in other words, whether the data requested by central banks reflects the way reporters and source systems record their business for their own purposes. The closer these types of data are aligned, the cheaper reporting costs become. Judged by these standards there is scope to improve central bank operations and reduce reporter burden. For example, the column on form BE labelled 'Other currencies' is a reporting artifice at odds with the reality that each position recorded by firms in their source systems is denominated in a particular currency. So a more streamlined, granular approach to collecting data might reduce reporters' burden by minimising the number of forms and guidance notes reporters need to be familiar with, and proactively pre-empt ad-hoc requests by central banks to fill in data gaps in their data collections. While all these initiatives are admirable, they are piecemeal in the sense that they pertain to particular financial subsectors and products. What remains undone is the development and effective implementation of a data standard to comprehensively cover all financial activities. There are now some efforts in this vein underway such as the Financial Industry Business Ontology (FIBO). 34 However, their use by financial firms and regulators remains limited.
The creation and adoption of a common financial language (Ali et al. 2012 ) is critical to the success of post-crisis financial regulation. Common data standards facilitate comparability, enabling central bankers and regulators to compare the performance of a particular reporter against peers (micro-prudential analysis) and to build up an accurate aggregate picture of all reporters (macro-prudential and macro-economic analysis).
The prospect of arriving at and implementing common data standards in finance might sound as fanciful as Hobbes' thought experiment discussed at the start of the article. However, there are real, historical precedents when standardisation has been achieved (see also Milne 2013) . The European System of Accounts and the United Nations Systems of National Accounts are two examples. Another is the Systéme International d'Unités (SI). The SI was a remarkable achievement. Until its establishment in 1960, there was no consistent standard of measurement across Continental Europe. For instance, instead of a single, general category to measure length, there existed a plurality of units whose usage depended on context and the particular object measured. The fathom was used to record the depths of the sea, the pace used to describe distances travelled, and the foot used to measure out potato patches. As Felix Martin (2013) notes, "This was the lamentable state of affairs which the General Conference on Weights and Measures had been established to remedy, and the creation of the SI was the culmination of nearly a century's worth of international efforts to simplify and standardise the world's weights and measures." It introduced a set of seven basic units for measuring the physical world: the metre for length; the kilogram for mass; the second for time; the degree Kelvin for temperature; the candela for luminosity; the ampere for electric current; and the mole for substance.
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